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AUTHOR Harwood, Glenn R.
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ABSTRACT

Following passage of legislation to end the practice of drawing up treaties with the American Indians in 1871, President Ulysses S. Grant implemented a "Peace Policy" aimed at persuading the Indians of the uselessness of resistance. The Indian delegations' visits to Washington were one tactic in the control strategy the government used to placate the Indian nations. The purpose in bringing successive groups of chiefs to Washington was to impress them with the strength of the government and the wealth and power of the whites. If the Indians chose not to conform to government counterpersuasion, the decision-makers could maintain that the agitators would not listen to reason, and thus gain implicit approval for other control strategies. The spoken responses of the delegation chiefs were conciliatory, but the chiefs' ability to persuade other Indians to cease resistance was overestimated. Although the expenses of the delegation were far less than those for maintaining a cavalry, the Indian delegation tactic was ineffective, as chiefs such as Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull continued violent resistance. The delegation was, however, useful to Grant's administration in that it allowed a policy shift to violent suppression. Grant's "Peace Policy" effectively ended with the defeat of the calvary at Little Big Horn in 1876. (HTH)

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An Historical Evaluation of the Control Strategy of Indian Delegations' Visits

Glenn R. Harwood, Ph.D.
Instructor
Department of Speech Communication
University of Missouri at St. Louis
St. Louis, Missouri

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The lack of research on American Indian oratory was lamented in a recent article in the Quarterly Journal of Speech.[1] In an attempt to widen the scope of this dimension of rhetorical inquiry, this article examines the agitation-control relationship[2] that existed between the American government and the Ogallala Sioux during the administrations of President Ulysses S. Grant[3] and Peace Chief Red Cloud.[4]

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[1]James H. O'Donnell, "Logan's Oration: A Case Study in Ethnographic Authentication," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 65 (April, 1979): 150. O'Donnell notes that only 8 articles on Indians are listed under the public address heading in Ronald J. Matlon and Irene R. Matlon, ed., Index to Journals in Communication Studies Through 1974, (Falls Church, Virginia: Speech Communication Association, 1975).

[2]The control-agitation approach to the analysis of social movements examines "actions directed toward radical change in the social order" by agitational forces which "cannot be accommodated within the normal movement of the status quo." Robert S. Cathcart, "New Approaches to the Study of Movements: Defining Movements Rhetorically," Western Speech, 36 (Spring, 1972): 82.

[3]While the rhetorical situations analysed in this article occurred during Grant's administration, the rhetoric examined belongs to political spokesmen for the administration. It is interesting to note that the major governmental document dealing with Indian Delegations' visits is an intra-institutional message. This fact emphasizes the necessity of representatives in the executive branch continually rationalizing government policies to the Congress in order to receive the funding to pay for Indian Delegations' visits. U.S., Department of the Interior, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the year ending 1872, 42d Cong., 3d Sess., 1872-73, House Exec. Doc., No. 1, Indian Delegations Visiting Washington During the Year, (Serial 1560), 97-99.

[4]Red Cloud was peace chief of the Ogallala branch of the Sioux nation. The notion of American Indian government has been widely misunderstood. The term "chief" was an honorific title and implied little authority for the bearer, though an exceptionally powerful personality could exert great influence. Robert H. Lowie, Indians of the Plains, Published for the American Museum of Natural History, American Museum Science Books Series (Garden City, New York: The Natural History Press, 1963), p. 124. The social organization of many Plains tribes included many chiefs who gained social status by performing a wide variety of functions perceived as useful by the tribe. Thus, a person recognized as a good hunter was followed voluntarily by members of the tribe because he had been successful in this function in the past. Whites often confused the term chief with referents in white society such as "King" or "President." In fact, a chief only had power in the tribe because he was respected by other tribal members. One author notes that the feelings and opinions of each person in the tribe were considered so important that "even when his people were fighting for their lives--a man could go his own way and do whatever seemed right to him." Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., The Indian Heritage of America, (New York: Bantam Books, 1969), p. 34.

On March 3, 1871, the Congress passed a bill to end the practice of writing treaties with Indian tribes.[5] The bill stated that "hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty."[6] The effect of the bill changed the relationship between the United States government and the American Indian tribes from diplomacy by treaty between a powerful dominant nation and smaller domestic, dependent nations to diplomacy by "agreement"[7] with individual Indians. Another effect of the bill terminated the legal recognition of Indian chiefs.[8]

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[5]U.S., Congress, Senate, The Indian Appropriations Act for 1871-1872. Senate Report No. 268. 41st Cong., 3d Sess., 9, 1871-72.

[6]This stipulation to the Indian Appropriations Act ended a practice that had its inception in 1789 when the United States government acted toward American Indian tribes as if they were separate nations and dealt with the tribes by treaties arrived at by diplomatic relations according to precedents established by international law. After this "treaty period" the government tended to deal with individual Indians and Indian families, and to by-pass tribal leaders and to sometimes ignore the tribal groupings. Henry E. Fritz, The Movement for Indian Assimilation, 1860-1890, (Philadelphia: University of Pensylvania Press, 1963), pp. 56-86, and Robert Winston Mardock, The Reformers and the American Indian, (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1971), pp. 104-6.

[7]After the passage of the Indian appropriations Act, the Congress continued its relations with Indians by "agreements" which required the approval of both Senate and House. Ralph K. Andrist, The Long Death: The Last Days of the Plains Indians, (London: Collier-Macmillan Limited, 1969), p. 246. These "agreements" have been defined by one author as "legislative oversight on the basis of mutual consent." S. Lyman Tyler, A History of Indian Policy, (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of the Interior, 1973), p. 12.

[8]While it is true that the immediate effect of the Indian Appropriations Act was the termination of the legal recognition of Indian chiefs, the long-term effects of the bill were widely argued. Commissioner of Indian Affairs Francis A. Walker noted that another effect of the bill was that "So far as law is concerned, complete anarchy exists in Indian affairs...." Francis A. Walker, "The Indian Question," North American Review, Vol. 116, (1873), pp. 350-56. The humanitarian Board of Indian Commissioners were enthusiastic about the effect of the Indian Appropriations Act and "saw the change as only one step in the direction of Indian citizenship." Mardock, The Reformers and the American Indian, p. 105. Modern critics are also divided on the effects of the Act. Andrist applaudes the Act for abolishing "the entire ridiculous pretense that tribes were sovereignties..." The Long Death: The Last Days of the Plains Indians, p. 246. Another critic states that "With the passage of the Indian Appropriation Act of 1871, the last governmental roadblock to educating the Indian to the concept of landholding based on a system of private tenure was removed." Glenn R. Harwood, "The Movement for Assimilation: A Critical Analysis of the Rhetoric of Carl Schurz," (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Oregon, 1979), p. 81.

After the passage of the Indian Appropriations Act, the government devised new policies to deal with American Indians. The executive branch of government continued its relations with Indians without recourse to the treaty making process; the Supreme Court upheld the right of government to protect Indians from their more competitive neighbors; and finally, the Congress continued its relations with Indians by legislative oversight.[9] President Ulysses S. Grant depended on religious reformers[10] to carry out his "Peace Policy."[11] Secretary of the Interior Columbus Delano, Assistant Secretary B.R. Cowen, and Commissioner of Indian Affairs Francis A. Walker attended the January 1872 meeting of the Board of Indian Commissioners in Washington, D.C., and promised to give "hearty cooperation" to the Indian reform movement.[12]

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[9]Tyler, A History of Indian Policy, p. 12.

[10]The most influential religious reform organization was the Board of Indian Commissioners. The Board of Indian Commissioners, originally created in 1869, helped to control the activities of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. It was composed of religious and secular leaders who led the fight in Congress and the national press to bring about reform in Indian policy. Tyler, A History of Indian Policy, p. 76. William Welsh, Herbert Welsh, and Henry B. Whipple were leading Indian reformers and members of the Board of Indian Commissioners. William Welsh, the first President of the Board of Indian Commissioners, used his position as a platform to persuade the Congress, Executive branch, and the military to "aid the religious bodies charged with bringing Christian civilization to bear upon [the Indians] them." Fritz, The Movement for Indian Assimilation, 1860-1890, p. 82, and Harwood, "The Movement for Assimilation: A Critical Analysis of the Rhetoric of Carl Schurz," p. 60.

[11]President Ulysses S. Grant instituted the "Peace Policy" in 1869 to achieve some of the reforms recommended during previous administrations. Laurence F. Schmeckebier explains the policy as follows:

> ...he [President Grant] promptly adopted a new policy as regards the appointing of Indian agents by delegating their nomination to the several religious organizations interested in mission work among the Indians. This was a rather curious acknowledgement of the power of the politicians in controlling the appointments of the President. As the laws required Indian agents to be confirmed by the Senate, the President evidently felt that he could not secure the confirmation of men selected for other than political reasons unless there was some well-defined organization that Senators would fear to offend. In the early days of the administration the Society of Friends selected the agents in Nebraska, Kansas and Indian Territory." The Office of Indian Affairs, Government Research Monograph No. 48, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1927), pp. 54-55.

[12]U.S., Department of the Interior, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the year ending 1871, 42d Cong., 2nd Sess., 1871-72, House Exec. Doc., No. 1 (Serial 1505), 185-6.

Christian missionaries during the Grant administration believed that a thorough understanding of the precepts of Christianity would lift the "savage"[13] up from his "decimated state." Still, the "Peace Policy" was not universally supported by two major parties in the Indian affairs controversy: the military and the frontiersmen of the West.[14] American Indians were often "suspicious"[15] of government programs and promises. Indian suspicions were sometimes well-founded during the period of Grant's "Peace Policy." There were eight major military campaigns or expeditions between 1869 and 1876.[16]

The purpose of this paper is to examine one of the tactics used by the Grant administration to persuade Indians of the uselessness of resistance. The Indian Delegations' visit reached its peak as a persuasive tactic immediately after the passage of the Indian Appropriations Act of 1871. The purpose of the Indian Delegations' visit to Washington was to impress the Indians with the strength of the government and the wealth and power of the whites.[17] This tactic of counterpersuasion[18] attempted to convince

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[13]For an indepth discussion of the notion of the American "savage," see Roy Harvey Pearce, The Savages of America: A Study of the Indian and the Idea of Civilization, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965).

[14]Loring Priest, Uncle Sam's Stepchildren, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1942), p. 183.

[15]Vincent Colyer, telegram to Columbus Delano, October 19, 1871, Secretary of the Interior, Letters Received, as cited in Mardock, The Reformers and the American Indian, p. 101.

[16]The eight major military campaigns or expeditions between 1869 and 1876 are as follows: (1) the Modoc Expedition of 1873 in the Department of Columbia; (2) the Modoc War of 1873 in the Department of Columbia; (3) the Yellowstone Expedition of 1873 in the Department of Dakota; (4) the Sioux Expedition of 1874 in the Department of Platte; (5) the Black Hills Expedition by George Custer of 1874 in the Department of Dakota; (6) the Indian Territory Expedition of 1874-5 in the Departments of Missouri and Texas; (7) the Sioux War of 1875-77 in the Departments of Dakota and Platte; and (8) the Big Horn and Yellowstone Expedition by General Crook of 1876 in the Departments of Dakota and Platte. U.S., General Services Administration, Guide to Records in the Military Archives Division Pertaining to Indian-White Relations, (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Service, 1976), pp. 221-2.

[17]U.S., Department of the Interior, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the year ending 1872, 42d Cong. 3d Sess., 1872-73, House Exec. Doc., No. 1 (Serial 1560), 98.

[18]Counterpersuasion is a control tactic that attempts to convince the agitators that they are wrong. John Waite Boers and Donovan J. Ochs, The Rhetoric of Agitation and Control, (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1971), p. 41.

representative members of Indian tribes to conform to government policies. The Indian Delegations' visit projected an image of reasonableness to whites by preparing the argumentative ground for a shift in strategy.[19] If Indians decided not to conform to the counterpersuasion of the government, than the "decision makers within the institution can inform their membership that the agitators would not listen to reason, and thus the decision-makers gain implicit approval for other control strategies and tactics."[20]

The advantages of the Indian Delegations' visit tactic were appreciated by government officials in the Grant administration.[21] The Board of Indian Commissioners supported the tactic and advised the "desirableness of further employing the same means of reaching the public"[22] in order to vindicate the "Peace Policy" of the Grant administration.[23] The populace also seemed to respond favorably to the Indian Delegations' visits and often attended in large numbers the speeches given by Indians and government representatives.[24]

An analysis of a specific Indian Delegations' visit should illustrate the rhetorical strategies of the government and the response of the Indians. In the spring of 1872, representatives of the Ogallala Sioux took the train from the Wyoming Territory to

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[19]The counterpersuasion tactic allows for a shift to the strategy of adjustment more easily than from many other control tactics. Bowers and Ochs, The Rhetoric of Agitation and Control, p. 42.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Commissioner of Indian Affairs Francis A. Walker eloquently stated the advantages of the Indian Delegations' visit in his Annual Report of 1872. U.S., Department of the Interior, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the year ending 1872, 42d Cong., 3d Sess., 1872-73, House Exec. Doc., No. 1 (Serial 1560), 97-99. Since this document serves as the crucial data to prove the Grant administration's commitment to the Indian Delegations' visit tactic, the entire Indian Delegations Visiting Washington During the Year is recorded in this paper.

[22]Benjamin N. Martin, U.S. Indian Commission, letter to the Commissioner of Indian Affiars, June 10, 1872, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Letters Received.

[23]Mardock, The Reformers and the American Indian, p. 109.

[24]John Beeson, letter to B.R. Cowen, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, June 11, 1872, Secretary of the Interior, Letters Received.

Washington, D.C., on an official Indian Delegations' visit.[25] The delegation included a number of Ogallala chiefs: Red Cloud; Red Dog; Little Wound, Red Leaf; and Blue Horse. The government's purpose in arranging this visit was to persuade the Indians to accept the removal[26] of the Red Cloud Agency from its location on the North Platte River in Wyoming Territory to the Sioux reservation in Dakota Territory. The government wanted to remove the Ogallala Sioux because the John Bozeman trail directly crossed the Red Cloud Agency. The Ogallala Sioux, under the leadership of Red Cloud, refused attempts by the government to exchange their land for large gifts and annuities. The government sent troops up the John Bozeman trail to construct forts along it, and precipitated a war.[27] The government finally abandoned the strategy of violent suppression and adopted a policy of appeasement on November 6, 1868.[28] The tactic of counterpersuasion by inviting the chiefs of the Ogallala Sioux to Washington, D.C., in the spring of 1872, was an attempt to accomplish the same goal as the violent suppression of the 1860's--the opening of the John Bozeman trail.

The thirty member Indian delegation visited New York City and Peter Cooper's Union where they addressed audiences in an attempt to explain why the Ogallala Sioux did not want to leave the Red Cloud Agency. The rhetoric of Red Cloud and Red Dog and the

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[25]U.S., Department of the Interior, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the year ending 1872, 42d Cong., 3d Sess., 1872-73, House Exec. Doc., No. 1 (Serial 1560), 97.

[26]The removal policy argued that if the Indians were removed from contact with whites, the slow process of education, civilization, and Christianization could take place. Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative Years, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 224, and Tyler, A History of Indian Policy, pp. 56-60.

[27]On December 21, 1866, Captain William J. Fetterman and a unit of eighty men from Fort Phil Kearny were killed by the Ogallala Sioux under the leadership of Red Cloud. Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., The Indian Heritage of America, (New York: Bantam Books, 1969), p. 339.

[28]Red Cloud signed a treaty of peace at Fort Laramie on November 6, 1868. Josephy, The Indian Heritage of America, p. 339.

responses of government officials are instructive in assessing the productivity of the Indian Delegations' visit tactic.[29]

The Quaker Indian agent Benjamin Tatham[30] introduced the first speaker, Red Cloud, to the full house in the following words:

> We are glad to welcome you again among us. You have faithfully kept the promise of peace which you made in this room two years ago. We shall be glad to hear what you have to tell us now.[31]

This introduction was translated for the Indian delegation and the following reply by Red Cloud was translated for the audience:

> I am very glad to come and visit my friends, and very glad to see them all. God has given to me the daytime to work in, and I propose to work while it is day. God tells me to do all my work in the daytime, and when the night comes it will be time for me to return home. When He made the red man, He gave him this country to live in; when He made the white man, He gave him a country across the water. All my forefathers have lived in this country. Here I spent my boyhood; here I saw my friends and here I hope to live and die. My forefathers told me that the white men were made of the same clay as the red men, and I wish to live in brotherhood with every pale face on the broad continent, and to treat them as my brothers. I came to the Great Father and said to him, "Protect me in my own country, so that I may build school-houses,

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[29]There are a number of methodological difficulties in the translation of American Indian Speeches. The problem of establishing textual accuracy was most recently discussed in the field of Speech Communication in regard to Logan's speech. James H. O'Donnell, "Logan's Oration: A Case Study in Ethnographic Authentication," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 65 (April 1979): 150-56. Critics such as Wayne Moquin have lamented "we have to rely almost entirely on the transcriptions by white re-actors of what Indian said. What has come to us, therefore, is almost as much the product of who wrote it down as it is of the actual authors." Great Documents in American History, (New York: Praeger Pub., 1973), p. xiii. An excellent discussion of problems in establishing textual accuracy of Indian oratory is presented by James L. Hoban, Jr. "Textual Problems in American Indian Oratory," Unpublished article presented to the Department of Speech Communication, University of New Mexico, 19077, pp. 1-7.

[30]Benjamin Tatham is best known for his criticism of the "brutal massacre of the Piegans" by a battalion of cavalry under the command of Colonel E.M. Baker. The battle occurred on the morning of January 23, 1870, and 173 Indinas were killed. U.S., Department of War, Annual Report of the Secretary of War for the year ending 1870, 41st Cong., 3d Sess., 1870-71, House Exec. Doc. No. 1 (Serial 1446), 29.

[31]Benjamin Tatham's introduction of Red Cloud at Coopers Union on June 7, 1872, as recorded in The New York Times, June 8, 1872.

> wigwams, and bring up my people as the white people are brought up." When I come here I always come to the Great Father first and next to New York, because it is a great place, filled with lodges like the grass of the plains; and I want them to help me, who am poor and helpless. When I went to the Great Father before I returned to my people on the Platte I met with distrust, but now, when I came here, I left confidence behind me, because the Great Father has been good to us and always kept his promises, so my people believe in him. It takes more than three days to do any good. I have been to the Great Father to get encouragement, and I shall return to teach my people to imitate the whites. You can see how much I trust the whites, for I am here with my chiefs, who are all as glad to see you as I am, I have perfect confidence in the agent whom the Great Father has sent to us. He is honest. He is brave. He is wise; and I and my people will listen to his councels, and obey them. I wish to be on frienely sic terms with the whites whom I see here. I speak not only for the Ogalalas, sic who are my own people, but for all the tribes of the Sioux nation. I can protect the country which the Great Father has given me with my own men, and I wish he would take his soldiers away.[32]

Red Cloud's speech is representative of much American Indian oratory during the nineteenth century. There are two major points that should serve as a starting point for consideration of Red Cloud's speech in particular and American Indian oratory as a whole: (1) usually Indians were extremely brief in their speaking and wasted few words; and (2) since they knew no written word, they had to recall from memory everything they talked about.[33] Red Cloud's speech is concilliatory in nature, even to the extent of stating that he would "return to teach my people to imitate the whites." The explanation for such a rhetorical stance is clear, especially when historical events are taken into account.[34] It

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[32]Speech delivered by Red Cloud at Cooper Institute on June 7, 1872, as recorded in The New York Times, June 8, 1872.

[33]W.C. Vanderwerth, Indian Oratory: Famous Speeches by Noted Indian Chieftains, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1971), p. 6.

[34]On August 2, 1867, Red Coud engaged the American military under the leadership of Major J.W. Powell in the battle at Fort C.F. Smith, which is also known as the Hayfield fight. This was the first time that the Ogallala Sioux had fought soldiers with new breech-loading rifles. Red Cloud stated that in this battle "he had lost the flower of his fighting warriors and had resolved never to fight again." Red Cloud recorded in Dee Brown and Martin F. Schmitt, Fighting Indians of the West, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1975), p. 33.

seems probable that Red Cloud considered this speech to be more epideictic than demonstrative in nature,[35] and thus was careful not to breech the decorum he perceived appropriate for such an occassion.

Another explanation for the concilliatory nature of this speech may rest with the translation. For instance, the phrase "red man" in the introduction of the speech could be a translation of a wide array of American Indian concepts. It could simply be a translation of "the human beings" which is the characteristic manner that American Indian Plains tribes referred to themselves, or it could be a derogative phrase describing traditional enemies of the Sioux like "Filth-eaters, sore-lip, or Greasy-inside-their-mouths."[36] The same problem exists in the phrase "Great Father" in the conclusion of the speech for this phrase is a loose translation of such terms as "Grandfather," "the Everywhere Spirit," or other traditional Indian metaphors to describe their relationship with God.[37] The final statement in the speech seems clear, however, Red Cloud would clearly prefer to have the soldiers recalled from his tribes' land.

The second speech given in Cooper's Union received no introduction but immediately followed Red Cloud's presentation. Red Dog addressed the audience as follows:

> You all know me, I was here two years ago, and you saw me, and I saw you. When I went back, I told my people what I had seen, and of the audience that I had addressed in this place. My people were surprised at what I told them, and these chiefs wanted to come and see for themselves. The white

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[35] American Indian oratory can be separated roughly into two types which correspond in some ways to the Aristotelian categories of demonstrative and epideictic discourse. There was little need for a judicial type of oratory for the laws and customs of the tribe were passed down in an extensive oral tradition of literature. Glenn R. Harwood, "An Historical Evaluation of the Paviotso Ghost Dance Religion of 1890: The Rhetoric of Wovoka," The Communicator, 8 (1977): 27.

[36] Lowie, Indians of the Plains, p. 100.

[37] James Mooney, The Ghost-Dance Religion and the Sioux Outbreak of 1890, Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1896), p. 778.

> people are like the waves of the river, they are very strong, they can protect themselves. I wanted when I got back, to make my people like the whites, I chose a reservation, but it was not good, so I have come to ask the Great Father to get another reservation which will be better. This is why these chiefs are here, they wish to do what is right and to have their rights respected. And I hope the Great Father will enable me to bring up my children as yours are brought up, and that is all I have to say.[38]

The speech delivered by Red Dog is concilliatory in much the same way as the speech delivered by Red Cloud. Red Dog's use of metaphor--"the white people are like waves of the river"--illustrates a dimension characteristic of American Indian oratory. W.C. Vanderwerth has suggested that the Indian orator often "had a memorized set of metaphors which he used in emphasizing his speech."[39]

After the speeches by Red Cloud and Red Dog, Benjamin Tatham delivered a closing statement which declared that "these chiefs who spoke peace, meant peace, and nothing but peace."[40] Tatham's analysis about these Indians may have been correct but the ability of these chiefs to persuade other Indians to cease their resistance to the policies of removal and concentration was overestimated by both reformers and government officials.

The following report delivered to Congress by Indian Commissioner Francis Walker makes the government's case for continuation of the Indian Delegations' visit tactic:

INDIAN DELEGATIONS VISITING WASHINGTON DURING THE YEAR.

> Several unusually large and important Indian delegations have visited Washington during the past year. The tribes represented and the personnel of the delegations may be characterized as follows:

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[38]Speech delivered by Red Dog at Cooper Institute on June 7, 1872, as recorded in The New York Times, June 8, 1872.

[39]Indian Oratory: Famous Speeches by Noted Indian Chieftains, p. 4.

[40]Benjamin Tatham recorded in The New York Times, June 8, 1872.

(a) The Red Cloud or Ogallala Sioux.--This delegation consisted of thirty Indians. The chiefs were Red Cloud and Red Dog, (their second visit to Washington,) Little Wound, Red Leaf, and Blue Horse. The ostensible object of the visit of the delegation was to effect, without the use of force, the removal of the Red Cloud agency from its temporary location on the North Platte River to some point within the Great Sioux reservation. The opposition of Red Cloud and his people to this removal has its root, not in any preference for the present location, which is indeed uninviting and inconvenient, but in the fear that their retirement from the Platte will be in effect, at least in the result, the surrender of the left bank of that stream, to which these Indians cling with the greatest determination. The Department in inviting the delegation was, however, more particularly influenced by the desire to impress the Ogallalas with a sense of the power of the Government, in view of the approach of the Northern Pacific Railroad to the rich hunting-grounds of these Indians upon the Powder River. The Red Cloud Sioux form the nearest and most natural re-enforcement, in case of war, to the "hostile camps" of the Upper Missouri.

The visit of the delegation, though it has neither resulted in the removal of the agency this fall, nor prevented a great deal of insolence and some violence on the part of these Indians, both at the agency and toward the surveying parties of the Northern Pacific Railroad, is believed to have had a real and considerable effect, both in the way of making progress toward the accomplishment of the wish of the Department in the former direction, and in restraining this large and warlike band from joining in the attacks on the military expeditions to the headwaters of the Yellowstone. A score or two of young braves are believed to constitute all the re-enforcement received by Spotted Eagle and "The Gall," the chiefs who are understood to have led the night attacks on Major Baker and Colonel Stanley, out of the camps of the Ogallalas.

(b) Spotted Tail's band of Brule Sioux.--This delegation consisted of twenty Indians. The chiefs were Spotted Tail, Two-Strike, Swift Bear, and Iron-Shell. The object of inviting this delegation was to arrange amicably for the removal of the so-called "Whetstone" agency from the head-waters of the White River to the forks of that river, near its junction with the Missouri, and also to confirm the friendship of the Brule Sioux toward the Government in view of the disaffection of the Ogallalas, and the possibility of an early collision. The visit is reported as having been in a high degree successful. The Indians gave a cordial assent to the wishes of the Department in respect to the removal of the agency, to which they had previously manifested great repugnance, and since their return have shown none but the best disposition toward the Government.

(c) The Indians of Arizona.--The visit of this delegation resulted from the mission of General Howard to that Territory in April and May of this year. The delegation consisted of two Pimos, one Papago, one Yuma, and four Apaches. The representative character of these Indians, or their influence with the tribes to which they belonged, was not in all cases very well assured; but General Howard is confident that their visit resulted in good, and has forwarded the ultimate settlement of the difficulties so long experienced in Arizona.

(d) The Kiowas, & c.--This delegation, the largest and most important which ever visited Washington, was brought to this city by Captain H.E. Alvord, special commissioner of the Indian Office, for the pacification of these tribes. The delegation comprised representatives of the Kiowas, Comanches, Apaches, Arapahoes, Wichitas and affiliated bands. The absence of the Cheyennes, who had been scared away from the place of meeting with the special commissioner by the advance of Colonel McKenzie's force, and the refusal of the Qua-ba-da Comanches to send representatives to Washington, constituted the only defects in the completeness and authority of the delegation.

(e) The Grand River and Fort Peck Indians.--This double delegation was brought to this city by the commissioners who visited the Upper Missouri for the pacification of the roving Sioux. It consisted of fifteen Indians from the Grand River agency, the principal chief of each of the three bands of Sioux attached to that agency being present, and of nineteen Indians from the vicinity of Fort Peck, and from the hunting-grounds west and south. The absence of Sitting Bull and Black Moon, the most influential chiefs of the "hostile camps," prevented that complete success which had been hoped for from the visit of this delegation; but the Indians thus brought to Washington were genuine Indians, out of the hostile camps, and of no mean reputation and influence among the "implacables." Their visit to Washington cannot fail to produce a decided effect by reducing the number of those who stand out against the progress of the railroad, even if it does not wholly withdraw the roving bands from their position of antagonism to the Government.

(f) The Utes of Utah.--This delegation, consisting of three Indians from the Uintah Valley reservation, was brought to Washington by late special agent Dodge, of Salt Lake, under permission granted upon urgent telegraphic representations of the necessity of such a visit. The delegation seemed not to have been fortunately constituted, nor was the judgment of the special agent, as to the importance of the business to be transacted, approved by the Department.

(g) The Sacs and Foxes of the Missouri.--This delegation, consisting four Indians, visited Washington at the expense of the tribe, with a view to concluding arrangements for the disposition to be made of the proceeds of their lands about to be sold under authority of law, and for their location among the Osages in the Indian Territory. The objects of the mission were satisfactorily completed so far as they could be without legislation.

The advantages of bringing well-constructed delegations from wild and potentially hostile tribes to Washington are very decided, and amply repay the expenditure involved. The impression derived thereby to the savages of the strength of the Government, and the wealth and power of the whites, is a more effective peace-maker than many soldiers, yet the expenses of all the Indian delegations that have visited Washington the last three years have not equaled the cost of maintaining a company of cavalry for six months in the field.

It must be considered that the Indians of the plains have, up to a recent date, really believed that they outnumbered the whites. How, indeed, should they have thought otherwise? Most of them had at one time or another, seen as many as five thousand, some as many as ten thousand of their people camped together, one-third fighting men. Of the whites what had they seen? A few ranches miles apart, a few hunters and trappers, a few soldiers. The stories that had been brought to their ears of a country where the whites were

> like the sand on the sea-shore, where houses were piled on top of houses, and where houses stood side by side with houses for miles in every direction, were received by them as the merest fables invented to amuse or deceive them. Even when the first delegations that visited the East, though composed of their own trusted chiefs and braves, returned and reported what they had seen, they were not believed; but it was said among their tribes that the white men had put "bad medicine" upon their eyes to make them see things that did not exist. It has only been the concurrent testimony of many chiefs and braves, out of many bands and tribes, that has dissipated this happy conceit of the Indian of the plains, and made him to appreciate, as he is beginning to do, the power and resources of the whites. As it is at once cheaper and more humane to bring the savages to a realizing sense of their weakness and the impossibility of long contending with the Government, by giving a few chiefs and braves free rides on our railroads and Broadway omnibuses, than by surprising their camps on winter nights and shooting down men, women, and children together in the snow, it will be well to continue this system, in moderation as to amount of expenditures, and with discretion as to the subjects of it, until the occasion for thus impressing the minds of the Indians shall have passed away.[41]

Francis Walker's evaluation of the value of "the impression derived...to the savages of the strength of the Government,..." is generally accurate. And Walker's cost-benefit analysis that "the expense of all the Indian delegations that have visited Washington the last three years have not equaled the cost of maintaining a company of cavalry for six months in the field" also seems reasonable. Still, in the final analysis, the tactic of the Indian Delegations' visits and the larger strategy of the "Peace Policy" were ineffective. While it is true that Red Cloud informed his tribe of the strength of the whites, they interpreted this message to mean that Red Cloud's "spirit had been bowed."[42] While Red Cloud did council the uselessness of resistance, many other chiefs such as Crazy Horse, Black Moon, and Sitting Bull defied both the treaty of 1868 and all other "agreements." In fact, just after Red Cloud and his delegation returned to the agency, Black Moon, with several hundred Sioux and Cheyennes, attacked eight troops of cavalry under Major E.M. Baker near Pryor's Fork, Montana, on August 14, 1872.[43]

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[41] U.S., Department of the Interior, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the year ending 1872, 42d Cong., 3d Sess., 1872-73, House Exec. Doc., No. 1, Indian Delegations Visiting Washington During the Year, (Serial 1560), 97-99.

[42] Dee Brown, Fighting Indians of the West, p. 85.

[43] Ibid., p. 87.

Still, the tactic of Indian Delegations' visits may have fulfilled one useful purpose for the Grant administration--it allowed for a shift in policy from counter-persuasion to violent suppression. By February 1, 1876, the Interior Department had notified the War Department that "implacable" members of the Sioux and Cheyenne should be forced to return to their reservations. On March 17, 1876, a detachment of soldiers under Colonel J.J. Reynolds attacked the Camp of Sioux and Cheyennes under the leadership of Two Moons and He Dog. The camp was burned and all the winter robes and meat were destroyed.[44] This battle helped to convince the Sioux and the Cheyennes to unite and make a determined stand against the whites. On June 26, 1876, the "Peace Policy" effectively ended with the defeat of the Seventh Cavalry at the Little Big Horn.

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[44]Ibid., p. 93.

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